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Abstract:
While previous literature has offered two broad categories of explanation for individual trade
preferences: economic self-interest and non-economic factors, we contend that during times of
intensified elite discourse on trade, individuals may follow elite opinions to form their opinions
on trade. Utilizing data from the 2016 American National Election Survey, we examine the effect
of Trump’s protectionist views and rhetoric on public trade opinion. We argue that there was a
“Trump effect” on trade attitudes among the mass public in 2016 and this effect went beyond the
party line, meaning that Trump supporters, regardless of their partisanship, were more likely to
be influenced by his protectionist views and to adopt anti-free trade positions. Moreover, we
suggest a conditional effect of political knowledge on the “Trump effect” of trade opinion. Our
empirical tests offer strong support for both hypotheses, suggesting a significant “Trump effect”
on public trade opinion in 2016.

Keywords:
Trade opinion, Trump effect, political knowledge, protectionism, elite discourse and rhetoric
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The costs and benefits of free trade has been long debated among social scientists. Despite
the consensus among economists that free trade is mutually beneficial to involved countries
through greater production and more efficient resource allocation, open trade also has inevitable
negative political consequences. The rapid growth of open trade in the second half of the 20th
century, in part, led to losses of manufacturing jobs and deep discontent among citizens in
western developed countries (Margalit 2012; Rodrik 1997). Puzzled by the discrepancy between
the widely known benefits of free trade and waves of protectionist sentiment among the public,
scholars have endeavored to explore the determinants of public opinion on trade, proposing
explanations such as economic self-interests, education, nationalism and ethnocentrism, concerns
about the social and cultural consequences, partisanship, issue framing, endorsement, and
wording of survey questions (Heckscher 1919; Stolper and Samuelson 1941; O’Rourke and
Sinnott 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Herrmann et al. 2001; Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Hiscox
2006; Medrano and Braun 2012; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Balistreri 1997; Mansfield and Mutz
2009; Margalit 2012; Mutz and Kim 2017; Winslett 2016; Dür and Schlipphak 2020).
Building upon previous literature, we contend that during times of intensified elite
rhetoric on trade and trade policies, individuals may follow elite discourse to form their trade
opinions. In this paper, we examine the effect of political elites on public trade opinion in the
context of the 2016 presidential election. In 2016, Trump’s negative rhetoric toward trade during
the presidential race was a national sensation. A significant part of Trump’s campaign was based
on criticism of current US trade policy and its large trade deficit. We chose the 2016 election
year because this election features the first major presidential candidate in recent US history who
fiercely attacked free trade; it provides an excellent example of heightened volume of one-sided
elite discourse on the issue of trade. We argue that presidential candidate Donald Trump had a
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strong influence on trade attitudes among the mass public, and this effect could go beyond
partisanship. Building on the rich literature of political elites’ influence on public preferences,
we hypothesize that Trump supporters, regardless of their partisanship, were more likely
influenced by his protectionist views because of their pre-existing anti-openness predispositions.
In addition, the “Trump effect” should be larger among more knowledgeable Trump supporters
because they are more likely to acquire political messages on trade and more able to analyze and
accept Trump’s messages consistent with their anti-openness predispositions.
Utilizing data from the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES), we find strong
support for our hypotheses. Indeed, supporters of Donald Trump are significantly more likely to
oppose free trade and support limiting imports from other countries even after controlling for a
full range of explanations suggested by previous literature and accounting for the possibility of
reciprocal causality. Furthermore, we find evidence of the conditional effect of political
knowledge on this “Trump effect:” politically knowledgeable Trump supporters are more likely
to be influenced by Trump’s protectionist rhetoric. Interestingly, once we consider “Trump
support” as an explanation, we see the effect of partisanship disappears; in a robustness check
with split samples we find that the “Trump effect” is more salient among Democrats and
Independents.
Taken together, these findings suggest that theories on public opinion formation based
solely on economic interests or party-driven changes cannot capture the whole story of trade
opinion, and that the persuasive power of political elites does not necessarily only operate
through a partisan channel. Our findings contribute to the trade opinion literature by
demonstrating that trade attitudes can be influenced by political elites, a viewpoint that prior
research on trade opinion has not focused much attention on. In addition, the findings reveal the

5
possibility that elite persuasion could sometimes play an even more important role in public
opinion formation than economic reasoning or even partisanship.
In the remainder of the paper, we first offer a detailed theoretical account on the
determinants of trade opinion proposed by previous literature. We then discuss how and why
elite rhetoric may influence citizens’ attitudes and extend this to the possible influence of Donald
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric on Americans’ trade opinion, and further, discuss how this
relationship may be conditional upon political knowledge. In the next section, we introduce our
data and empirical methods used to test our hypotheses. In the last two sections, we discuss the
statistical results, our findings and their implications for future research.
Determinants of Trade Opinion
The most well-known existing research on trade opinion attributes a great deal of the
variance in trade attitudes to individuals’ economic self-interest (Stolper and Samuelson 1941;
O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Balistreri 1997). For example, the
Heckscher-Ohlin theory suggests that in skill-abundant countries, free trade will increase the
demand for and raise the relative wages of high-skill workers but decrease the demand for and
lower the relative prices of low-skill workers. As a result, high-skill workers will likely support
free trade but their low-skill counterparts will oppose it (Stolper and Samuelson 1941).
Numerous studies have found empirical support for the Heckscher-Olin theory on trade opinion
in the US, Canada, Latin America and in a cross-national context (Scheve and Slaughter 2001;
Balistreri 1997; Baker 2003; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001).
The later Ricardo-Viner model argues that workers cannot easily move across sectors in the
short run, and therefore one’s trade opinion is based on how open trade influences the sector that
one works in. As a result, individuals working in import-intensive sectors will oppose free trade,
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but individuals working in export-intensive sectors will support free trade (Brock & Magee
1978; Irwin 1998). The Ricardo-Viner model, also called the specific factors theory, has gained
relatively less empirical support. Researchers find that whether or not an individual works in
import- or export-intensive sector is at best a weak predictor of one’s trade preferences (Scheve
and Slaughter 2001; Hays, Erlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Mansfield and Mutz 2009).
More recently, a growing body of literature argues that trade opinion can be also influenced
by non-economic factors such as individuals’ feelings about out-groups based on ethnocentrism
and nationalism, partisanship, as well as concerns over the social and cultural consequences of
trade (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott
2001; Mutz 2017). For instance, by employing data from the National Annenberg Election
Survey and a survey conducted by Knowledge Networks, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find that
economic self-interest, whether it be skill-based or sector-based, has little influence on
Americans’ trade attitudes. Instead, one’s educational attainment is a strong predictor of trade
opinion, and education is a reflection of one’s anxiety from out-group threats based on
tendencies toward nationalism, isolationism and ethnocentrism. Those with higher levels of
tolerance for out-groups and with more cosmopolitan worldviews will likely support free trade,
but those holding ethnocentric, nationalist and isolationist views will likely oppose free trade
(Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Likewise, Kaltenthaler et al. (2004) also find education as the most
important predictor of individual attitudes toward trade liberalization.
Building upon this stream of research, Margalit (2012) contends that opposition to free trade
can be also caused by individuals’ concerns over the social and cultural consequences of open
trade, such as increased foreign influence, westernization, and the loss of traditional moral codes.
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In her recent book, Guisinger (2017) argues that concerns over trade’s impact on communities
and the nation as a whole plays an important role in public trade opinion than one’s self-interest.
Another group of researchers focused their attention on political predictors of trade attitudes
(Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Mutz 2017; Hiscox 2006; Medrano and Braun 2012; Winslett 2016;
Dür and Schlipphak 2020). Among them, some argue for the importance of partisanship in
shaping one’s trade opinion (Mutz 2017), while others investigate the effects of framing and
endorsement (Hiscox 2006; Medrano and Braun 2012) or the relationship between trade opinion
and party competition (Winslett 2016). For example, Mutz (2017) ascribed Americans’ trade
opinion changes after 2016 to party realignment. According to her, even though the Republican
party was known as the party of free trade in America for decades, conservatives and
Republicans began to show more negative views about free trade compared to their liberal and
Democratic counterparts in recent years. The primary reason was because conservatives and
Republicans have long held higher levels of nationalist views, racial antipathy and social
dominance orientation, all of which could contribute to opposition to open trade (Mutz 2017).
Medrano and Braun (2012) argue that the majority of citizens are uninformed and their answers
to survey questions on free trade depends on how survey questions are framed, their perceived
degree of economic vulnerability and endorsements by political parties and interest groups.
Framing and endorsement are two other political predictors that are found to influence
public trade opinion. In an experiment, Hiscox (2006) discovers that participants are 17% less
likely to favor freer trade when exposed to anti-trade framing such as discussions linking trade to
job losses; however, pro-trade framing linking trade with lower consumer prices does not have
an effect on individuals’ trade opinion. Additionally, Hiscox (2006) finds that less educated
respondents are more sensitive to the framing effect, and endorsement can raise support for trade
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across the board especially among those who received anti-trade framing. Using a survey
experiment, Dür and Schlipphak (2020) only find limited evidence for elite cueing effects on
citizens’ support for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in both Germany
and Spain, but they argue that the elite cueing effects are likely understated because of
participants’ possible exposure to elite cues outside the context of the experiment. Other research
on trade opinion suggests that the general public is less likely than elites to support free trade
(Hermann et. al, 2001), and that parties do change their approach to trade policy depending on
the distribution of public opinion in the electorate (Winslett 2016).
Another type of framing that could affect Americans’ trade opinion is the connection of
trade issues with China. In an experimental study, Kerner, Sumner and Richter (2020) show
participants a pet furniture advertisement mentioning offshore production and then ask their
support for free trade. They find that only the “offshore production in China” prime reduces
support for free trade. It is not surprising that Americans connect China with their attitudes
toward free trade, as it is widely perceived that trade with China has caused higher
unemployment, lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in local labor markets in the
US (Autor et al. 2013; 2016).
Beyond the Party Line: The Influence of Elite Rhetoric on Trade Opinion
Even though the trade opinion literature has not focused a lot of attention on the effect of
political elites, public opinion scholars have had a long tradition exploring the influence of
political elites on citizens’ policy preferences in general (Zaller 1992; Jacoby 1988; Cohen 2003;
Johnston 2006; Broockman & Butler 2017, Gabel & Scheve 2007). In his classic work, Zaller
(1992) argues that mass public opinion is influenced heavily by political elites such as
politicians, upper-level government officials, journalists, political activists, and policy
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specialists. Zaller uses the “Receive-Accept-Sample” model to explain how political elites can
play an important role in individuals’ formulation of political opinions. Besides Zaller’s research
which is perhaps the most well-known work in the field, other scholars have argued for the
importance of political elites in changing citizens’ opinion on policy issues. For instance,
Abramowitz (1978) finds that voters update their issue attitudes after learning about candidates’
positions in a presidential debate. In a field experiment, Minozzi et. al (2015) find that political
leaders can persuade their constituents’ attitudes toward policy issues after interacting with them
in online townhalls. Broockman and Butler (2017) also find that elites’ positions influence
voters’ opinion in a field experiment where they send letters to citizens stating their legislators’
policy positions. Gabel and Scheve (2007) find that negative elite messages about European
integration decreased public support for European Union.
The normative implications of empirical evidence of elite-driven attitudes have drawn
some scholarly attention too. For example, Hochschild (2012) raises questions about the meaning
of democracy in a world in which mass opinion is driven largely by elite cutes, particularly in
light of Zaller’s suggestion that elite opinion is better informed and hence has advantages over
mass opinion. Hochschild identifies instances in which mass opinion correctly follows elite
opinion (e.g., civil rights laws, tobacco smoking), as well as others in which mass opinion
correctly deviates elite opinion (e.g., mass resistance to Clinton impeachment, the Tea Party
movement). Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) explore the effects of polarization on
mass susceptibility to elite cues and find that under conditions of high polarization, individuals
are much more likely to follow and incorporate into their policy attitudes elite policy cues.
In this paper, we build upon existing research on elite discourse and public opinion and
argue that citizens’ trade opinion can be influenced by political elites. While the consideration of
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elite influence on public opinion in general is not brand new, our specific focus on the nexus
between political elites and public trade opinion contributes to the trade opinion literature. Even
though Hiscox (2006) and others have initiated exploration in this area by studying the effects of
framing and endorsement on trade opinion, aside from their work, political elites’ influence on
public trade opinion remains relatively understudied. The effect of political elites on trade
opinion is particularly relevant today considering that in recent years, numerous nationalist
politicians in Latin America, Europe and the United States have focused on attacking free trade
and seeking protectionist policies in their political campaigns, with Trump as a prime example.
How Trump’s Protectionist Discourse Influences Trade Opinion
In 2016, Trump based a significant part of his campaign on criticism of current US trade
policy and its large trade deficit. Trump often cited examples of job losses and factory shutdowns
in the Rust Belt in the Midwest and Northeast to make his case (see a few examples of his
rhetoric in the endnote)1. In addition to criticizing domestic trade policies, Donald Trump also
blamed the US’s trade partners—especially China. Trump persistently asserted that certain trade
partners were the culprit of the decline of certain industries in the US, especially manufacturing,
and that US was being taken advantage of by its trade partners. For example, calling the U.SChina trade balance a “theft,” he said, “we can't continue to allow China to rape our country”
(Diamond 2016) (see a few more examples of similar rhetoric in the endnote)2. Trump made
particularly effective use of various media strategies to gain exposure and disseminate his
messages (Azari 2016). Along with traditional rallies, his protectionist rhetoric was widely
disseminated through social media such as Twitter (Wells et al. 2016).
Zaller’s “Receive-Accept-Sample” model suggests that individual citizens acquire
information from elites or trusted sources, filter it and accept information that comports with
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their own preconceived values; when answering survey questions they will then sample
information available at the top of their heads (Zaller 1992). Empirical evidence suggests that
when contested issues are given significant media coverage, individuals take notice and update
their own policy ideas consistent with their predispositions (Dancey & Goren, 2010). According
to Zaller (1992), political predispositions are shaped by a person’s lifetime experiences, such as
childhood socialization and policy-related everyday experiences like paying taxes, working, or
racial discrimination. Predispositions influence people’s responses to elite information by
regulating the acceptance or nonacceptance of the political messages received.
In 2016, Trump supporters came from different backgrounds but the core Trump
supporters shared a commonality—they all had pre-existing anti-openness predisposition. Recent
research points out that the core Trump supporters in 2016 were either those who are “left
behind” (McQuarrie 2017; Hackworth 2019; Clark 2017) or those who felt “status threat” from
increased diversity and globalization (Mutz 2018; Major et al. 2016; Knowles and Tropp 2018;
Blum and Parker 2019). Both of these two types of Trump supporters already had anti-openness
predispositions before Trump even ran for the presidency. For instance, the first type of Trump
supporters, those who are left behind economically such as workers in the Rust Belt of the
Midwest and Northeast, likely already blamed international trade, openness and outsourcing for
their job losses prior to 2016. When hearing Trump talk about unfair trade deals, trade deficits,
and the connections with job losses, they will easily connect their own situation with these
messages. Similarly, the other group of Trump supporters, i.e., individuals who felt their
majority racial status or America’s global dominance status being threatened, may already have
blamed openness for bringing in immigrants and blamed globalization for America’s economic
decline. When they hear Trump speak about America losing to other countries, they may quickly
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connect free trade with American’s economic decline in the world and consequently form antitrade opinions.
Given that individuals are most likely to take notice of information consistent with their
predispositions and use that information to update their own policy ideas, we can safely argue
that these two core groups of Trump supporters will be most likely influenced by his
protectionist rhetoric in their trade opinion formation process due to their pre-existing antiopenness dispositions. 3
Even though there is a rich body of literature that focuses on the influence of party
identification on public opinion formation 4, we argue that there are nuances between the effects
of political elites and partisanship. Lenz (2012) suggests that individuals often bring their issue
attitudes in line with views of their preferred candidate instead of those of their parties. Based on
Lenz’s foundational work, we contend that the persuasive power of political elites does not
solely operate through a partisan channel; instead, the political elite can persuade supporters by
tapping into their political predispositions similar to his or hers. Such persuasive power can
reinforce one’s prior partisanship, but it can also make one challenge his or her prior partisan
views. For example, a voter who identified as a Democrat in previous elections finds Trump an
attractive candidate because of his stance on immigration policy might also end up adopting his
position on trade, even though the voter is cross-pressured by his or her prior party identification.
Despite this attitude change, the voter may not necessarily change their party affiliation
immediately, given that it is typically stable over time. It is documented that many Democratic
voters in the Rust Belt states, for example, chose to support Donald Trump in 2016 without
changing their partisanship; many of them continued to vote Democratic in the 2018 midterm
election (Cohn & Miller 2018; Dias et al. 2016).
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Therefore, a simple partisan explanation of mass policy attitudes cannot account for this
pattern of change, especially in an era with prominent political figures that do not clearly fit
traditional party lines. Given this, it is meaningful to analyze whether individuals’ opinions are
influenced more by partisanship or by the political elite they choose to follow. Even though
Mutz’s (2017) recent work on trade opinion ascribed the change of Americans’ trade opinion to
party realignment, we argue that the effect of political elites might be another important reason
for the change and the Trump effect could go beyond partisanship.
Based on these arguments, we propose that core Trump supporters, regardless of their
partisanship, tend to have pre-existing anti-trade and anti-openness predispositions; when
exposed to Trump’s protectionist rhetoric, such pre-existing political predisposition among
Trump supporters can be “waken up” and reinforced. Therefore, compared to non-Trump
supporters, Trump supporters are more likely influenced by Trump’s anti-trade views in forming
their trade opinion. This “Trump effect” could go beyond the traditional Democratic-Republican
partisan divide. From this, we develop our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Trump supporters, regardless of their partisanship, are more likely to accept
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric and form anti-free trade opinions.
Political Knowledge as a Mediator
A major part of Zaller’s intellectual contribution in public opinion lies in the mediating
role of political knowledge in accepting political information to form issue attitudes. According
to Zaller, individuals with higher levels of political knowledge are more likely to acquire and
comprehend (“Receive”) political messages concerning a certain political issue, especially
complex issues that are less relevant to their own everyday experience. Additionally, when
receiving political messages from elites, individuals with higher levels of political knowledge are
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more able to analyze received information, resist arguments contrary to their political
predispositions and accept information consistent with their predispositions. Political knowledge
therefore plays a dual role in the opinion formation process: on the one hand, it increases the
likelihood for one to acquire political information; on the other, it enhances one’s ability to
analyze and accept political messages consistent with their own political predispositions. Those
who possess higher levels of political knowledge are better at both tasks, resulting in a higher
chance for them to be influenced by information consistent with their predispositions. Because
Trump’s supporters are already more likely to hold predispositions against openness, among
them, those with higher levels of political knowledge will be more likely to acquire information
on trade-related issues and more likely to analyze and accept Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric.
More intuitively, if we compare two Trump supporters: Trump supporter A with high
levels of political knowledge and Trump supporter B with low levels of political knowledge.
Even though both supporters likely have anti-trade predispositions, supporter A is more likely to
pay attention to Trump’s speech on trade and more likely to search for Trump’s trade policy
claims. Even more crucially, supporter A’s political knowledge will help him/her analyze the
messages and absorb the information consistent with his/her own pre-existing anti-openness
predisposition. When asked a trade-related survey question, supporter A will more likely sample
the accepted information to answer the question. In contrast, supporter B with low levels of
political knowledge will be less attentive to political speeches, resulting in less exposure to
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric. Even when B catches the messages, he/she is less able to analyze
and absorb the information to update their own trade opinion.
One may argue that political knowledge can help individuals critically analyze the
messages and as a result increase the chance of rejecting Trump’s messages. Indeed, according to
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Zaller, those with higher levels of political knowledge are more able to critically analyze the
messages they receive, but they will reject the messages inconsistent with their own
predispositions instead of messages inconsistent with scientific findings for example. For
individuals whose predisposition on trade differs from Trump’s views, it is true that high levels
of political knowledge will enhance the chance for them to critically analyze and then reject
Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric. In other words, high-knowledge Trump opposers are least likely to
be influenced by Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric when shaping their opinion. Based on these
arguments, we posit our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: More knowledgeable Trump supporters are more likely to be influenced by
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric. In contrast, more knowledgeable Trump opposers are least likely
to be influenced by Trump’s protectionist rhetoric.

Data and Methods
In order to test our hypotheses, we employ data from the 2016 ANES, and we use two
measures of trade opinion: (1) attitudes toward import restrictions and (2) attitudes toward free
trade agreements. We use logistic regression and ordinal logistic regression to predict individual
trade opinion as a function of Trump support, political knowledge, the interaction of Trump
support and political knowledge, as well as a full set of control variables. Detailed descriptive
statistics of all variables are included in the Supplemental Material.5
Dependent Variables
Attitudes toward import restrictions. Our first dependent variable is based on the
following question: “Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order
to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt
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American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports?” 62.23% of
respondents favored placing new limits on imports, which is coded as 0. 37.77% respondents
opposed placing new limits on imports, which is coded as 1.
Attitudes toward free trade agreements. The second dependent variable is based on the
question: “How strongly do you favor, or oppose the U.S. making free trade agreements with
other countries?” We combine the seven-point scale response into three categories: favor (coded
as 2, 39.51%), neither favor nor oppose (coded as 1, 40.29%), and oppose (coded as 0, 20.2%).6
Independent Variables
Support for Donald Trump. Support for Donald Trump is measured by one’s feeling
thermometer (0-100) of Donald Trump, with 0 indicating the respondent does not like Trump
and 100 meaning (s)he likes him.
Political knowledge.

We create an additive score based on nine political knowledge

questions. These questions include: whether or not the respondent knows Senate term is 6 years,
foreign aid is the smallest federal spending item, Republicans control the House and Senate, and
whether the respondent can identify Joe Biden, Paul Ryan, Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin and
John Roberts. These nine items have an alpha statistic of 0.72.
Support for Trump ×political knowledge. In order to capture the conditional effect of
political knowledge, we include a multiplicative term of the two variables.
Control Variables
Skill level.

The Heckscher-Ohlin theory argues that in skill-abundant countries like the

US, high-skill workers will likely support free trade but their low-skill counterparts will oppose
it (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). We include a measurement for individual skill level and utilize
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the proxy of average income by industry and match that with each respondent to indirectly
capture skill level following previous research (Mansfield and Mutz 2009).7
Import orientation. The Ricardo-Viner model argues that individuals working in importintensive sectors will oppose free trade, but individuals working in export-intensive sectors will
support free trade (Brock & Magee 1978; Irwin 1998). We consider the export orientation and
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠

import orientation of one’s industry, and calculate them by ln (
ln (

𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝐷𝑃

𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝐷𝑃

) and

).8 These two measurements are highly colinear so we only include import

orientation in our models.
Partisanship. Considering the important role of partisanship on public opinion, we include
one’s party identification as a control variable. Partisanship is a 7-point scale indicator, with 7
indicating strong Republican and 0 indicating strong Democrat.
Financial worry.

In addition to the objective measures of economic self-interest, we also

capture the subjective assessment of one’s financial situation as an explanation for trade opinion.
We posit that individuals who worry about their financial situation are likely more vulnerable in
the open trade environment and therefore may more likely oppose open trade. To measure
individuals’ perception of their own financial status, we use the following question, “how
worried are you about your current financial situation.”
Nationalism and Ethnocentrism. A growing body of literature argues that trade opinion
can be also influenced by non-economic factors such as ethnocentrism and nationalism
(Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mutz and Kim
2017). To capture nationalism, we consider five questions related to nationalist sentiment, and
combine them by using principal component factor analysis and regression scoring.9 Feelings
toward out-groups, or ethnocentrism, is measured by feeling thermometers of three minority
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groups: Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians (each ranging from 0-100). We use principal component
factor analysis in the same way to generate a factor score of ethnocentrism.10
Demographic controls. We also include demographic control variables such as age,
household income, education, union membership, and gender.
Results
For each of our dependent variables, we run three models: Model (1) is a baseline model
where we include all explanations for trade opinion but exclude support for Trump; in Model (2)
we add our core independent variable, support for Trump, in order to test our first hypothesis, the
“Trump Effect;”Model (3) tests the second hypothesis by adding the interaction term between
support for Trump and political knowledge. Table 1 includes all three models with attitudes
toward import restrictions as the dependent variable, while Table 2 includes all three models
with attitudes toward free trade agreements as the dependent variable.
Attitudes toward Import Restrictions
We first explore determinants of attitudes toward import restrictions. We purposefully coded
opposing import limits as 1 and supporting import limits as 0, so that a positive coefficient in
Table 1 indicates a positive association between the independent variable and support for free
trade. As one can see from Table 1 Model (1), before we consider support for Trump,
partisanship has a negative and significant effect on the dependent variable. Because Republican
is coded as a higher value in partisanship, a negative coefficient of partisanship means
Republicans are more likely to support import limits, and Democrats are more likely to oppose
import limits. This is consistent with Mutz’s (2018) finding that Republicans were more negative
about trade in recent years. Additionally, one’s political knowledge and education levels both
have a positive and significant effect, but nationalism has a negative and significant effect on the
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dependent variable. These results suggest that individuals with lower levels of education, lower
levels of political knowledge, or stronger nationalist views are more negative about open trade.
Moving to Table 1 Model (2) in which we add support for Trump, we notice that Trump
support has a negative and highly significant effect on the dependent variable. Intuitively, this
result suggests that Trump supporters are more likely to support placing new limits on imports,
and this finding verifies our first hypothesis. Interestingly, once we consider Trump support, the
effect of partisanship becomes insignificant. In other words, even though on surface it seems like
Republicans were more likely to hold anti-trade opinions during the 2016 Presidential election,
once we take the “Trump effect” into consideration, the role of partisanship disappears; instead,
it is Trump supporters who consistently held more anti-trade opinion. This finding verifies our
speculation that the “Trump effect” on trade opinion goes beyond partisan lines. In a robustness
test, we further split our sample by respondents’ partisanship and see whether the Trump effect
exists among Democrats and Independents.
In order to test our second hypothesis, we include an interaction term between political
knowledge and support for Trump in Table 1 Model (3). The results show that both the
interaction term and political knowledge have significant effects on the dependent variable. The
interaction term makes straightforward interpretation of the coefficients challenging from the
table alone, therefore, we graph a figure by using the Clarify addition to Stata 12.0 to intuitively
display the conditional effect of political knowledge on support for Trump and
supporting/opposing import restrictions (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000).11 Below Figure 1
(a) displays the predicted effects of Trump support on “opposing import restrictions” among
individuals with high and low levels of political knowledge. As one can see, the line for high
levels of political knowledge has a much steeper slope compared to the line for low levels of
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political knowledge, indicating that the effect of Trump support on “opposing import
restrictions” is larger among individuals with high levels of political knowledge. More
specifically, among political knowledgeable citizens, the predicted probability for non-Trump
supporters (when feeling thermometer of Trump=0) to oppose import restrictions was about
62%, but for Trump supporters (when feeling thermometer of Trump=100) the rate quickly
reduced down to 15%, creating a difference of 47%. However, among individuals with low
levels of political knowledge, the difference in predicted probability of opposing import
restrictions between non-Trump supporters (46%) and supporters (18%) is only 28 percentage
points, a much smaller gap.
Figure 1(b) shows a similar pattern. Likewise, among politically knowledgeable citizens, the
predicted probability for non-Trump supporters (when feeling thermometer of Trump=0) to
support import restrictions is only 38%, but for Trump supporters (when feeling thermometer of
Trump=100) it is 85%, for a difference of 47 percentage points. However, among individuals
with low levels of political knowledge, the difference between non-Trump supporters (54%) and
supporters (82%) is only 28 percentage points, a much smaller difference. Overall, Figure 1(a)
and (b) both show strong support for our second hypothesis, in that the “Trump effect” is
amplified among politically knowledgeable individuals. Model (3) still shows that partisanship
does not have a significant effect on trade opinion, while nationalism, education and financial
worry all still have similar effects on the dependent variable. Overall, these findings lend support
for our two hypotheses and are consistent with previous studies. In the Supplemental Material,
we compare the magnitude of the Trump effect with the effects of other variables, and the results
show that the Trump effect is the largest compared to other variables.
Attitudes toward Free Trade Agreements
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We now turn to Table 2 when we use attitudes toward free trade agreements as our
dependent variable. Model (1) shows that partisanship, nationalism and union membership all
have significant and negative effects, and education has a significant and positive effect on
attitudes toward free trade agreements. These results suggest that Republicans, Union members,
and those with nationalist views or lower education levels are more likely to oppose free trade
agreements. Again, we find no support for the effects of skill levels or industry-level exposure to
trade, consistent with findings from Table 1 and those from Mansfield and Mutz (2009).
Different from Table 1, we do not observe a significant effect of political knowledge or financial
worry on attitudes toward free trade agreements.
Moving to Model (2) when we add Trump support, we find that Trump support again has a
significant and negative effect on support for free trade, lending further support to our first
hypothesis. Once including Trump support, we notice that the coefficients of both nationalism
and party identification shrink and are no longer statistically significant, but education level and
union membership still significantly impact attitudes toward free trade agreements. This suggests
that in 2016, the “Trump effect” on trade opinion goes beyond partisan lines, and it is Trump’s
supporters that were more likely to hold negative views about free trade agreements, rather than
a particular partisan or ideological group.
To test our second hypothesis, Model (3) includes an interaction term between Trump
support and political knowledge. Again, in order to more intuitively interpret the conditional
effect, we graph figures by using the Clarify addition to Stata 12.0 (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg,
2000) and present the results in Figure 2. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) display the predicted probabilities
for supporting and opposing free trade agreements, respectively, across support for Trump
among individuals with high and low levels of political knowledge. In both figures, the lines
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representing high levels of political knowledge show a steeper curve, suggesting a larger effect
of Trump support on attitudes toward free trade agreements. In Figure 2(a), we can see that as
Trump support increases from 0 to 100, the predicted probability of favoring free trade
agreements decreased quickly from 59% to 19% among those who are politically
knowledgeable. Yet, among individuals with low levels of political knowledge, the predicted
probability of favoring free trade agreements stayed relatively the same, only changing from
47% to 30%. This is because individuals with low levels of political knowledge are less likely to
acquire or receive political information on trade issues, and even if they do, they are less able to
analyze the message to accept/reject it based on their political predisposition.
Figure 2(b) shows a similar pattern. The predicted probability of opposing free trade
agreements is the highest among Trump supporters with high levels of political knowledge. This
is because (1) Trump supporters are more likely to hold anti-trade political predispositions, and
(2) politically knowledgeable Trump supporters are more likely to acquire information on trade
issues and also more able to accept protectionist rhetoric in forming their opinions as such
rhetoric is consistent with their own predisposition. Overall, Figure 2 provides decent support for
our second hypothesis. In the Supplemental Material, we compare the magnitude of the Trump
effect with the effects of education (the only control variable that has a significant effect) , and
the results show that the magnitude of the Trump effect is comparable to that of education.
In sum, our empirical findings offer strong support for both of our hypotheses: supporters
of Donald Trump are more likely to adopt a protectionist view of trade, and this effect varies
based on individuals’ ability to accept these messages based on their political knowledge.
Additionally, we show that although there appears to be a partisan difference in trade opinions,
the effect of partisanship disappears when we consider support for Trump. Objective measures of
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one’s economic self-interest such as their skill level and the import-orientation of their sector do
not have a significant effect on trade opinion. Our findings also suggest that education is a
consistently important factor for individual opinions on trade, even after taking account of
emotional factors based on nationalism and ethnocentrism, consistent with prior research which
finds consistent effects of education (e.g. Kaltenthaler etl al, 2004). Nationalist views have a
significant effect on Americans’ trade opinion, although the effect of nationalism on attitudes
toward free trade agreements falls out when considering Trump support. These findings are
consistent with conclusions drawn by an important trade opinion study in Mansfield and Mutz
(2009). Even though we did not find any evidence that ethnocentrism affects trade opinion, it is
perhaps because trade opinion is centered around concerns of the declining status of the nation
rather than a specific racial group.
Robustness Checks
Using IV-2SLS to Address Endogeneity
Even though our empirical analyses show strong support for both hypotheses, we find it
imperative to address the problem of reverse causality, or endogeneity between support for
Trump and trade opinion. Fordham and Kleinberg (2012), for example, claim that predicting
support for trade based on related attitudes is inherently problematic in terms of determining the
direction of causality. In our case, it is possible that individuals’ trade attitudes are influenced by
Trump’s rhetoric; however, it is also possible that individuals choose to support Trump because
of their existing anti-trade attitudes. In order to better test our hypothesis, we need to ensure the
Trump effect on trade opinion is robust even when accounting for the possibility of reverse
causality. To do this, we employ a two-stage least-squares model with instrumental variables
(IV-2SLS) to address the endogeneity issue. By using instruments which are exogenous to the
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dependent variable and highly correlated with our independent variable, we can “purge” the
endogenous component of the independent variable and assess whether its effect on our
dependent variable still holds (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2007).
We are able to identify three instrumental variables from the 2016 ANES dataset which
meet the required conditions: (1) respondents’ opinion on whether the country needs a “strong,
determined leader who will crush evil and take us back to our true path;” (2) respondents’
opinion on whether Barack Obama is a Muslim; and (3) a feeling thermometer towards illegal
immigrants. These instruments meet the requirements because: (1) they are related to support for
Trump; (2) there is no direct theoretical causal connection between these three instruments and
individuals’ trade opinion. A more detailed description on how we choose these instruments and
a full set of diagnosis tests are included in the Supplemental Materials. All the diagnosis tests
show that our instruments meet all the requirements.
Turning to the results of the IV-2SLS models, in the first stage models, as shown in Table
3, we estimate Trump support as a function of the instrumental variables and the control
variables in our original models. The predicted values of the first stage models, or fitted values,
represent an instrumented measure of Trump support purged of the influence of trade attitudes.
We then, in the second stage models, use the purged Trump support variable to predict two
dependent variables: (1) attitudes toward import restrictions, (2) attitudes toward free trade
agreements.
Results of the second stage models are presented in Table 4. In Table 4 Model (1), the
coefficient for Trump Support (b= -.008, SE= .001) is still negative and statistically significant,
suggesting that Trump support still has a significant positive effect on trade opinion even after
we control for endogeneity. Likewise, the coefficient for Trump support in Model (2) (b= -.009,
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SE= .002) is still negative and statistically significant, also suggesting that Trump support still
has the same effect on support for free trade agreement after accounting for endogeneity. Based
on these results, we are confident that our empirical tests withstand the challenges of
endogeneity and reverse causality.
Differentiating Trump Effect from Partisan Effect
In this paper, we argue that elite persuasion can have effects above and beyond that of
partisanship, but we also understand that the effect of political elites and partisan effect can be
hard to differentiate. For example, one may raise the concern that changes in trade attitudes
among the highly politically knowledgeable Trump supporters are actually because of
Republicans bringing their attitudes in line with the Republican presidential nominee. We
conduct some additional analyses to further differentiate the Trump effect from partisan effect.
We argue that if the above-mentioned concern is true, then the “Trump effect” on trade attitudes
should be observed only among Republican copartisans, and not among Democrats or
independents, as non-Republicans do not have the same party pressure to update their beliefs.
We would also observe that only the individuals most supportive of Trump exhibit this pattern of
updating their beliefs, as opposed to individuals who are cold or lukewarm towards Trump. To
test whether the effects of Trump support on trade opinion follow these patterns, we re-estimate
Model (3) from Tables 1 and 2, this time splitting our sample by party identification
(Independent, Democrats, and Republicans) and Trump support (0-50 vs 51-100).
The results show a different pattern as predicted by a partisan explanation. It appears that
the impact of Trump support on trade attitudes is more salient among Democrats and
independents, and the group of individuals who are cold or lukewarm toward Trump. In fact, we
observe null effects for Trump support when we restrict the sample to Republicans only or to
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strong Trump supporters only. We have included these additional results in our Supplemental
Materials. Taken together, these results suggest an opposite pattern of what we would expect if
trade attitude changes were driven primarily by partisan motivated reasoning (i.e., Republicans
being influenced by their party’s nominee); therefore, we are confident that the Trump effect we
observe is truly driven by Trump himself and it is beyond the partisan effect.
Is the Trump Effect Repeatable?
In order to make sure the “Trump effect” we observe in 2016 is not a single case, we provide
additional evidence to show that the effect of elite rhetoric is enduring and repeatable.
Considering that an important reason behind the observed Trump effect is Trump’s fierce attack
against free trade, we needed to find another presidential candidate who did the same, and this
itself was a difficult task, simply because Trump was the first major party presidential candidate
to openly advocate U.S. foreign trade retrenchments. In recent history, we only found one third
party presidential candidate, who similarly attacked free trade. In the 1992 presidential election,
Ross Perot, the Reform Party presidential candidate famously said that a trade agreement like
NAFTA will cause a “giant sucking sound” when jobs are lost to Mexico (Shalken 2019). He
fiercely and openly attacked free trade and repeatedly said free trade was bad for American jobs.
His message resonated with “workers, unions, environmentalists and people in manufacturing
towns across the country, helping him earn 20 million votes or about 19% of the total” (Shalken
2019: 1). His attack on free trade was still remembered by many today. Based on our theory,
Ross Perot should have a similar negative effect on public trade opinion. We employ the 1992
ANES data to test the proposition, and our results indeed show a strong and significant “Perot
effect” on public trade opinion. The results are included in the Supplemental Materials.
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Additionally, we employ the Voter Study Group (VSG) 2017 survey data to test whether the
Trump effect remained one year after the election. In this test, we use Americans’ attitudes
toward free trade as the dependent variable, and one’s Trump favorability as the independent
variable. We observe a similar effect: Trump favorability in 2017 was still a significant predictor
of one’s trade attitudes; those who favored Trump were still much more likely to oppose free
trade in 2017. The results of this robustness test are also included in the Supplemental Materials.
Taken together, these two tests show additional evidence that the influence of political elites’
anti-free trade discourse on public trade opinion is repeatable and enduring.
Conclusion
The 2016 presidential election featuring Donald Trump’s attack on open trade and the
subsequent trade war with China has brought the issue of trade into the center stage of American
politics. During his campaign and presidential debates in 2016, Trump persistently and fiercely
attacked the US’s trade deficits, its trade policies and accused other countries of taking
advantage of the US in international trade. Various public opinion polls show that Americans’
support for free trade fell sharply during 2016 (Jones 2017). This paper takes a first step to
examine the previously overlooked effect of political elites on trade opinion.
By using the 2016 ANES data, we find that Trump supporters are significantly more likely
to oppose free trade agreements and support imports restrictions. This relationship remains
strong and significant even when we control for the possibility of endogeneity (i.e., individuals
support Trump because of their trade opinion). Interestingly, when we consider Trump support,
the effect of partisanship on trade opinion disappears. Our additional robustness check suggests
that Trump effect on trade opinion was not merely a partisan effect, as the Trump effect was
more salient among Democrats and Independents. Even though Mutz (2017) ascribed the change
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in trade opinion after 2016 to partisanship, our paper highlights the Trump effect and
differentiates it from a pure partisan effect.
Our project also suggests that the effect of Trump support on trade opinion is conditioned by
one’s political knowledge. The effect of Trump support on trade opinion is larger among
individuals with higher levels of political knowledge, and this is because knowledgeable
individuals are more likely to acquire political information and more able to accept political
messages consistent with their political predispositions. Conversely, individuals with low levels
of political knowledge do not care about politics as much and as a result are not interested in
acquiring political information related to complex issues like trade; they are also less likely to
hold a strong or stable political predisposition, and far less able to analyze or absorb information
from political elites based on their own political predisposition. Our research provides
confirmation to Zaller’s view that public opinion is heavily influenced by political elites and that
political knowledge plays an important role in this process.
Findings from our paper also suggest a complex reality of presidential support in America
today. Through his campaign messages, Donald Trump successfully tapped into many
Americans’ feelings of decline and marginalization in a globalized age and transformed that into
support and even faith in him. It is often suggested that individuals with lower levels of
education are more likely to be Trump supporters. However, our research shows that among his
supporters, it is the more knowledgeable ones who are more likely to be influenced by Trump’s
views on important issues like trade. Knowledgeable Trump supporters share a few traits that
make them the strongest base of Donald Trump: (1) they are sophisticated enough to hold stable
political predispositions similar to Trump’s views, (2) they are more interested in acquiring
political messages from Trump and others on complex issues, and (3) they are more capable of
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analyzing these messages and accept information consistent with their existing predispositions.
Because Trump’s supporters have similar prejudices and political views with him, messages
delivered by Trump that carry stereotypical frames will align with their predisposition and result
in a higher chance for them to accept these messages and update their beliefs. While this is not
exactly a calculus of economic costs and benefits, it is also not completely “irrational” behavior.
Although Americans’ perceptions of free trade have declined in recent years, the Pew
Research Center shows that Americans’ support for free trade already rebounded from a
historical low in 2017 (Jones 2017). The escalation of the trade war was perhaps the sobering
moment for many Americans. When businesses witness lower demand of exported products and
when consumers experience increased price of imported goods, they may start to “feel the pain”
and shift back toward support for free trade.
Our study is not without limitations. Due to limitations of data availability, we did not
directly test the effect of elite discourse/rhetoric on trade opinion. Experimental studies directly
linking Trump’s campaign messages on trade and changes in one’s trade opinion could more
accurately capture the causal mechanism between elite rhetoric and trade opinion. However, at
the minimum, our study offers a critical perspective for understanding the nature of Americans’
attitudes toward free trade in this current political environment. While it remains important to
consider both economic circumstances and relevant symbolic attitudes in the study of trade
opinion, we show that it is also critical to consider to what extent individuals’ policy opinions are
influenced by political elites, and how Americans can form their opinion following political
elites instead of their own economic calculus of costs and benefits.
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Endnotes
[1] Below are a few examples of Trump’s rhetoric when attacking trade. “We as a nation lost
$817 billion dollars on trade. That is ridiculous and it is unacceptable.” “I have visited the cities
and towns across America and seen the devastation caused by the trade policies of Bill and
Hillary Clinton…NAFTA is the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere but certainly ever
signed in this country.” “You go to New England, Ohio, Pennsylvania, you go anywhere you
want, and you will see devastation where manufacturing is down 30, 40, sometimes 50 percent.”
[2] Below are a few examples of Trump’s attacks on America’s trade partners: “We're not
making things anymore, relatively speaking. Our product is pouring in from China, pouring in
from Vietnam, pouring in from all over the world. We have people that are political hacks
negotiating our trade deals.” “People have no idea how badly our country has been treated by
other countries. They've destroyed the steel industry, they've destroyed the aluminum industry.”
“You take a look at what’s happening to steel and the cost of steel and China dumping vast
amounts of steel all over the United States, which essentially is killing our steelworkers and our
steel companies.”
[3] Besides these hardcore Trump supporters who share similar political views with him, one
may argue that there are other types of Trump supporters such as reluctant Republicans
supporting the nominee of their political party and individuals who dislike Hillary Clinton and as
a result supported Trump. These unwilling Trump supporters only comprise a very small portion
of the “big tent” of Trump supporters, as our data show. For example, reluctant Republican
supporters of Trump (i.e., Republicans who voted for Trump but had a lower than average
feeling thermometer score of Trump) only comprised 4.1% of all Trump supporters. Individuals
supporting Trump only because they dislike Hillary Clinton (i.e., individuals who voted for
Trump but had a lower than average feeling thermometer score for Clinton and Trump) only
comprised 6.0% of all Trump supporters. Therefore, in this paper we focus our attention on the
majority of the “big tent” of Trump supporters, or the core groups of Trump supporters, who are
either economically left behind, or felt a status threat. These two groups may or may not support
Trump himself, but they both tend to share similar anti-trade and anti-openness views with
Trump.
[4] Since the seminal work by Campbell et al. (1960), a rich body of previous research has
studied the importance of partisanship on public opinion formation. Individuals’ party
identification is often considered as a “prime mover” of their issue attitudes. Individuals receive
cues from party leaders, and the cues will then play an influential role in the development of their
policy positions (e.g. Jacoby 1988; Gilens and Murakawa 2002; Cohen 2003; Johnston 2006).
The classic “Michigan model” even claims that party identification is the “unmoved mover” of
political issue attitudes (e.g. Campbell et al., 1960). Political psychologists have identified the
prevalence of motivated reasoning, where individuals, on a cognitive level, tend to selectively
receive and interpret information to support certain conclusions that match their party
identification (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2013).
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[5] Because of our inclusion of ethnocentrism, we estimate our main statistical models by only
including non-Hispanic white respondents, but present statistical results when considering all
respondents in our Supplemental Material. The results remain the same.
[6] Responses of this question include seven categories: “oppose a great deal” (6.9%), “oppose
moderately” (9.46%) “oppose a little” (3.84%) “neither favor nor oppose” (40.31%), “favor a
little” (6.82%) “favor moderately” (22.84%) and “favor a great deal” (9.85%). Because a
significant plurality of individuals answered this question neutrally, we combined the three
“oppose” responses into one, and the three “favor” responses into one category, in order to make
the three categories more balanced. We also ran the same models by using the original sevencategory variable, and the results remain the same. These results are included in Supplemental
Material.
[7] We first collect data on wages and salaries per full-time equivalent employee by industry
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), then merge these income data with ANES using
the NAICS occupation codes. Because 1,595 respondents reported their employment status as
unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, homemaker or student, we could only match
industry-level average income and import orientation data for the rest of the respondents who
reported a valid industry of occupation. This limitation resulted in a much smaller sample size of
our models. To remedy this, we also matched industry-level data based on respondents’ most
recent occupation if they are unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, homemakers or
students. We ran the same models with the expanded sample, and the main results stay the same.
These additional results and their interpretation are included in the Supplemental Material.
[8] Using information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the US Census Bureau NAICS
Trade Database, we calculate export and import orientation for each industry. We then match
each individual with an industry using their self-reported occupation and the NAICS codes. For
cases in which BEA Industry GDP data was an aggregate of multiple NAICS codes, the total
import/export amounts for those sectors were added together, and divided by the combined GDP.
[9] These five questions include: (1) how seeing the American flag flying makes the respondent
feel, (2) how important is American identity to the respondent, (3) whether the world would be
better if it was more like the USA, (4) if being American means following American customs,
and (5) whether being American means being born in the USA. We generate a new variable
nationalism and rescale it to 0-1. The retained principal component factor has an eigenvalue of
2.34 and an alpha statistic of .71.
[10] The retained principal component factor has an eigenvalue of 2.36 and an alpha statistic of
.86.
[11] For display purposes we use the 75th percentile value of political knowledge as an example
of knowledgeable individuals, and the 25th percentile value of political knowledge as an example
of individuals holding low levels of political knowledge.
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Table 1. Trump Support, Political Knowledge and Opposing Import Restrictions

Model (1)
Coefficient
Standard
(b)
Error
Support for Trump
Political Knowledge
Support for Trump × Knowledge
Skill Level
Import Orientation
Financial Worry
Nationalism
Ethnocentrism
Age
Household income
Party ID
Education
Union Membership
Gender
N

0.103**
-0.001
0.014
-0.245***
-2.239***
-0.051
-0.009
-0.000
-0.189***
0.131***
-0.376
-0.171
1195

(0.037)
(0.002)
(0.011)
(0.062)
(0.407)
(0.072)
(0.005)
(0.011)
(0.034)
(0.038)
(0.213)
(0.140)

Model (2)
Coefficient
Standard
(b)
Error
-0.018***
(0.003)
0.091*
(0.038)
-0.001
0.016
-0.238***
-1.373**
-0.071
-0.008
-0.003
-0.031
0.113**
-0.340
-0.229
1191

(0.002)
(0.011)
(0.063)
(0.433)
(0.073)
(0.005)
(0.011)
(0.044)
(0.039)
(0.216)
(0.144)

Note:
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Coefficients and standard errors rounded to 3 decimal places. Constant estimates omitted.

Model (3)
Coefficient
Standard
(b)
Error
-0.001
(0.006)
***
0.222
(0.058)
-0.003**
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.015
(0.011)
-0.237***
(0.063)
**
-1.320
(0.438)
-0.069
(0.074)
-0.008
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.010
(0.044)
0.108**
(0.039)
-0.332
(0.218)
-0.200
(0.144)
1191
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Table 2. Trump Supporters, Political Knowledge and Support for Free Trade Agreements

Model (1)
Coefficient
Standard
(b)
Error
Support for Trump
Political Knowledge
Support for Trump× Knowledge
Skill Level
Import Orientation
Financial Worry
Nationalism
Ethnocentrism
Age
Household income
Party ID
Education
Union Membership
Gender
N

0.004
0.000
0.010
-0.061
-0.904**
0.060
0.005
0.008
-0.099***
0.148***
-0.319*
-0.105
1539

(0.027)
(0.000)
(0.008)
(0.045)
(0.310)
(0.054)
(0.004)
(0.008)
(0.026)
(0.027)
(0.158)
(0.102)

Model (2)
Coefficient
Standard
(b)
Error
***
-0.013
(0.002)
-0.009
(0.027)
0.000
0.011
-0.049
-0.187
0.044
0.005
0.007
0.009
0.132***
-0.318*
-0.161
1534

(0.000)
(0.008)
(0.045)
(0.333)
(0.054)
(0.004)
(0.008)
(0.032)
(0.027)
(0.159)
(0.103)

Note:
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Coefficients and standard errors rounded to 3 decimal places. Constant estimates omitted.

Model (3)
Coefficient
Standard
(b)
Error
-0.004
(0.004)
0.078
(0.044)
*
-0.002
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
0.011
(0.008)
-0.046
(0.045)
-0.150
(0.334)
0.050
(0.054)
0.005
(0.004
0.007
(0.008)
0.022
(0.032)
***
0.129
(0.028)
-0.301
(0.160)
-0.144
(0.103)
1534
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Table 3: First Stage Models of the IV-2SLS Model

Variable

Dependent Variable: Support for Donald Trump
Model (1)
Model (2)
First Stage OLS Model
First Stage OLS Model
(2nd Stage DV: imports)
(2nd Stage DV: free trade)
Coefficient
Standard
Coefficient
Standard
(b)
Error (se)
(b)
Error (se)

Instruments
2.649***
(0.257)
2.596***
(0.227)
Belief Obama is Muslim
Necessity of strong
4.677***
(0.595)
4.946***
(0.527)
leader
-0.158***
(0.030)
-0.148***
(0.027)
Illegal Immigrant Feeling
Political Knowledge
0.363
(0.339)
0.109
(0.300)
Skill Level (avg.
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
income)
Import Orientation
0.106
(0.100)
0.052
(0.086)
Financial Worry
0.603
(0.548)
0.277
(0.489)
***
***
Nationalism
20.611
(4.332)
24.200
(3.784)
Ethnocentrism
0.834
(0.701)
0.382
(0.617)
Age
0.017
(0.044)
0.035
(0.039)
Household income
-0.095
(0.096)
-0.073
(0.085)
***
***
Party ID
6.265
(0.354)
5.895
(0.314)
Education
-0.375
(0.349)
-0.387
(0.304)
Union Membership
3.138
(1.916)
2.271
(1.720)
Gender
-4.360***
(1.274)
-5.155***
(1.116)
N
1163
1485
Note:
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Coefficients and standard errors rounded to 3 decimal places. Constant estimates
omitted.
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Table 4: Second Stage Models of the IV-2SLS Model

Variable
Instrumented IV
Support for Donald Trump
Political Knowledge
Skill Level (avg. income)
Import Orientation
Financial Worry
Nationalism
Ethnocentrism
Age
Household income
Party ID
Education
Union Membership
Gender
N

Second Stage Dependent Variables
Model (1)
Model (2)
Attitudes toward import
Attitudes toward free trade
restrictions
agreements
Coefficient
Standard Error Coefficient
Standard
(b)
(se)
(b)
Error (se)
-0.008***
0.015*
-0.000
0.004
-0.040***
-0.058
-0.017
-0.001
-0.000
0.033*
0.016*
-0.047
-0.053

(0.001)
(0.007)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.012)
(0.108)
(0.014)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.014)
(0.008)
(0.042)
(0.028)

1163

Note:
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Coefficients and standard errors rounded to 3 decimal places.
Constant estimates omitted.

-0.009***
-0.008
0.000
0.005
-0.023
0.131
0.013
0.002
0.001
0.040*
0.050***
-0.127*
-0.050
1485

(0.002)
(0.010)
(0.000)
(0.003)
(0.017)
(0.155)
(0.020)
(0.001)
(0.003)
(0.019)
(0.011)
(0.059)
(0.039)
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Figure 1. Trump Support, Political Knowledge and Attitudes toward Import Restrictions, based on Table
1 Model (3)
(a). Predicted Probability of Opposing Import Restrictions
for High-/Low-levels of Political knowledge

(b). Predicted Probability of Supporting Import Restrictions
for High-/Low-levels of Political knowledge

Figure 2. Trump Support, Political Knowledge and Attitudes toward Free Trade Agreements, based on
Table 2 Model (3)

(a) Favoring Free Trade Agreements among
High-/Low-levels of Political Knowledge

(b) Opposing Free Trade Agreements among
High-/Low-levels of Political Knowledge

